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Abstract 
An influential strand of research has tested for the effects of immigration on natives’ wages and 
employment using exogenous refugee supply shocks as natural experiments. Several studies have 
reached conflicting conclusions about the effects of noted refugee waves such as the Mariel Boatlift in 
Miami and post-Soviet refugees to Israel. We show that conflicting findings on the effects of the 
Mariel Boatlift can be explained by a large difference in the pre- and post-Boatlift racial composition 
in subsamples of the Current Population Survey extracts. This compositional change is specific to 
Miami, unrelated to the Boatlift, and arises from selecting small subsamples of workers. We also 
show that conflicting findings on the labor market effects of other important refugee waves are caused 
by spurious correlation between the instrument and the endogenous variable introduced by applying a 
common divisor to both. As a whole, the evidence from refugee waves reinforces the existing 
consensus that the impact of immigration on average native-born workers is small, and fails to 
substantiate claims of large detrimental impacts on workers with less than high school. 
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Introduction
A long literature in labor economics has reached something of a consensus that the effects
of immigration on average native workers’ wages and employment is generally small or
zero.1 There is less consensus on the narrower question of the impact of immigration on
less-skilled workers: Blau and Mackie, eds (2016) conclude that the effect of immigration
on wages of U.S. workers with less than high school is negative, but do not reach consensus
on the magnitude of the effect.
An influential strand of research has tested for labor market effects on natives using exoge-
nous refugee supply shocks as natural experiments. Small or null effects on average native
workers have been found following large refugee inflows such as those in 1980s Miami (Card
1990), 1960s France (Hunt 1992), 1990s Israel (Friedberg 2001), and in the 1990s across
Europe (Angrist and Kugler 2003). But a subsequent and important strand of research
has revisited those earlier works, debating whether they missed impacts on subgroups of
natives such as the least skilled (Borjas 2017; Peri and Yasenov 2017), relied on inadequate
causal identification (Angrist and Krueger 1999), or both (Borjas and Monras 2017). The
discordant findings in this literature have not been reconciled.
In this paper we offer two new explanations for the conflicting results in all of the above
studies. One is large compositional changes in the underlying survey data introduced by
the selection of narrow subgroups of workers to study; the other is specification choices
in the use of instrumental variables. Accounting for these differences can reduce or even
eliminate substantial disagreement on the labor market effects of refugee waves in this
literature.
First, we show that the discrepancy between Card’s (1990) and Borjas’s (2017) analyses of
the 1980 Mariel Boatlift can be explained by a simultaneous large increase in the share of
blacks in the small subgroup of Miami workers of concern to Borjas. The fraction of blacks
is much higher in the post- than pre-Boatlift years in Borjas’s Miami sample of prime-age,
1See the National Academies consensus report for the United States (Blau and Mackie, eds 2016, 204),
or the survey by Kerr and Kerr (2011) including both the U.S. and Northern Europe.
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male, non-Hispanic workers with less than high school, while there is no such difference
in Card’s Miami sample of non-Cuban workers with high school or less, nor in the control
cities favored by either Card or Borjas. This compositional change offers an explanation
for the previous finding of Peri and Yasenov (2017), that the Borjas result is sensitive to
selecting a small subset of workers. We suggest three reasons for the compositional change,
including the 1980 arrival of black Haitians with less than high school and improved survey
coverage of low-wage black males already in the United States.
Because both Haitian blacks and U.S. blacks had lower wages than other workers with less
than high school, this compositional change tends to produce a spurious fall in average
wages for workers with less than high school. Our reanalysis of Borjas’s sample with an
adjustment for the share of blacks yields results similar to those of Card (1990) and Peri
and Yasenov (2017): little to no wage impact of the Mariel Boatlift is discernable. The
change in share of blacks can also explain other features of the recent reanalyses. For
example, both Borjas (2017) and Peri and Yasenov (2017) estimate wage effects of the
Boatlift using two different extracts of the Current Population Survey (CPS). They find
wage declines roughly three times larger in one extract than the other extract. The post-
Boatlift rise in the black fraction of the survey subsample is, likewise, about three times
larger in one extract than the other.
Second, we show that the Borjas and Monras (2017) applications of instrumental variables
to revisit the effects of the Mariel Boatlift and three other refugee waves—in France, Israel,
and across Europe—give similar results to the original studies after a specification correc-
tion. We show that the instrument used by Borjas and Monras, with which they find larger
harmful effects on native workers than found in some of the original studies, gives results
that can be reproduced with a placebo instrument. The Borjas and Monras instrument
rests on the attraction of new migrants to the locations of prior migrant inflows (Altonji
and Card 1991); the placebo instrument replaces information on prior migrant flows with
white noise, but gives similar results. This is a consequence of spurious correlation between
the instrument and the endogenous variable introduced by applying a common divisor to
both (Bazzi and Clemens 2013). The problem is addressed with a specification correction
that builds on Kronmal’s (1993), after which otherwise identical methods give the same
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results as the original instrumental-variable studies: a positive but statistically insignifi-
cant effect on native wages in Israel, a small detrimental and statistically significant effect
on native unemployment in France, and an unstable, statistically insignificant effect on
native unemployment in Europe.
Overall, we conclude that the evidence from refugee waves reinforces the existing consen-
sus that the impact of immigration on average native-born workers is small, and fails to
substantiate claims of large detrimental impacts on workers with less than high school.
The paper begins in Section 1 by reviewing discrepant analyses of the Mariel Boatlift in
Miami. It proceeds in Section 2 to review discrepant results on the effects of the three
other refugee waves. In Section 3 it concludes by discussing the interpretation of this
literature.
1 A refugee wave from Cuba: The Mariel Boatlift
In mid-1980, a sudden and unexpected influx of refugees from Mariel Bay, Cuba raised the
labor supply in Miami, Florida by seven percent. Card (1990) compares trends in Miami
to trends in four unaffected control cities and concludes that “the Mariel immigration
had essentially no effect on wages or employment outcomes of non-Cuban workers.” This
study has become influential in labor economics research methods and in immigration
policy debate, as well as in graduate economics education (Cahuc et al. 2014).
1.1 Conflicting reanalyses
Recent, concurrent reanalyses have reached contrasting conclusions about the robustness
of the original Card study. Both Peri and Yasenov (2017) and Borjas (2017) reanalyze the
Card result. While Card had studied the effects of the Boatlift on natives with high school
or less, both of the new reanalyses study the impact on natives with less than high school.
But in this latter subgroup, Borjas finds that the Boatlift caused the wages of males in this
subgroup to fall “dramatically, by 10 to 30 percent,” while Peri and Yasenov find instead
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“no significant departure between Miami and its control.”2 The studies stress different
extracts from the Current Population Survey (CPS), use different weighting variables to
construct synthetic control cities, and choose different groups of ‘natives’ to study. Borjas
focuses on non-Hispanic male workers with less than high school, except those under 25
or over 59. Peri and Yasenov (2017) focus on all non-Cuban workers age 19–65 with less
than high school.3
Several findings in these two conflicting reanalyses have not been adequately explained.
We seek to explain them here. These include:
• There is no observed effect on workers with high school or less, or workers with exactly
high school. The estimated wage effect of the Mariel Boatlift is indistinguishable from
zero for workers with high school or less (Card 1990), and positive for workers with
high school only considered separately.4 This sharp contrast versus the results for
less than high school is somewhat at odds with the fact that the Mariel boatlift
created a large positive shock to Miami’s supply of workers with high school only
and workers with less than high school: Almost half of the Mariel migrants did have
a high school degree (Borjas 2017, Table 1). Workers with high school only and
less than high school are close substitutes in the U.S. labor market (Card 2009).
It is of course possible in principle that the Mariel migrants with less than high
school complemented natives with high school only, to a degree that just offset the
substitution effect created by Mariel migrants with a high school degree.
• The observed effect size depends on the CPS extract used. Two nationally represen-
tative wage survey samples cover the years before and after the Mariel Boatlift: a)
the Current Population Survey (CPS) March Supplement, and b) a combination of
the CPS May supplement (through 1978) and the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotating
2Borjas (2017) studies wage effects and does not reanalyze Card’s null result on employment effects.
Borjas and Monras (2017) do reanalyze Card’s null result on employment, and confirm it, as do Peri
and Yasenov (2017). An issue faced by all studies is that the CPS did not collect country of birth at
this time (pre-1994), so the impact on ‘natives’ is inferred from estimated impacts on groups likely to be
predominantly natives.
3In both studies, ‘worker’ means a person reporting positive annual wage and salary income, positive
weeks worked, as well as (in the March CPS) reporting positive usual hours worked weekly, or (in the
MORG) positive usual weekly earnings and positive usual hours worked weekly.
4The latter finding is below in Figure 2d. The estimated effect is likewise positive for workers with high
school or more (Table 13, col. 4).
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Groups (MORG) from 1979. Borjas (2017, Tables 5–6) finds effects three times larger
in the March CPS data than in the May data. Peri and Yasenov (2017) attribute
this large difference to sampling error (the March CPS sample is smaller than the
MORG sample)5 and recall bias (the March CPS asks about earnings in the prior
year, the MORG in the survey week). But because the effect estimated by Borjas
(2017) persists across several years, it appears unlikely to arise from pure sampling
error or measurement error.
• There is no observed negative effect on U.S. Hispanics. No reanalysis of the Mariel
Boatlift finds negative wage impacts for samples that include non-Cuban Hispanics,
or for non-Cuban Hispanics separately.6 Borjas (2017) argues that omitting U.S.
Hispanics is necessary because many U.S. cities were experiencing a contemporaneous
influx of non-Cuban Hispanics, but Peri and Yasenov (2017) show that there is
no break in the Miami-only wage trend for workers with less than high school—
when Hispanics are included—between 1972–1979 and 1980–1990. Though excluding
Hispanics is consistent with attempting to study impacts on a predominantly native-
born sample, the lack of effect on Hispanics is nonetheless a puzzle. Theory does
not suggest a clear reason why Cubans would compete directly with non-Hispanic
workers while not competing at all with other Hispanics. English language skill is an
important segmenter of the labor market (McManus 1990; Peri and Sparber 2009;
Lewis 2013), suggesting that newly arrived Cubans could substitute for newly arrived
non-Cuban Hispanics at the same low skill level.7
• The largest wage effect estimated by Borjas occurs years after the supply shock ends.
Peri and Yasenov (2017) observe that after 1984, the share of Cubans among workers
with less than high school in Miami returned to pre-Boatlift levels in the CPS data.
5The March CPS sample is indeed small at 17–27 workers in each year 1977–1983, though the May
sample is even smaller (12 and 16 during the 1977–1978 surveys). The annual MORG sample falls in the
range 31–56; see Borjas (2017, Table 3).
6For our own reanalysis of the Borjas and Monras (2017) results on the Mariel Boatlift for Hispanics
only, see subsection 2.4 below. For our reanalysis of low-skill workers including Hispanics, see Figure 2b
below.
7The finding that the Mariel Cubans strongly substituted for non-Hispanics, but not for Hispanics,
contradicts contemporary evidence from nationwide census data. Using 1980 national census data, Borjas
(1987, 390) finds that Cuban immigrants are complements to black and white natives, as well as to black
and white immigrants. He also finds that Hispanic immigrants in general are complements to black natives,
concluding that in 1980, “Cubans have not had an adverse impact on the earnings of any of the native-
born male groups. In fact, a significant complementary relationship exists between Cuban men and white,
black, and Asian native-born men.”
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But the wage effects estimated by Borjas’s (2017) method are very large for several
years after 1984, peaking in the year 1986 and lasting through the end of the decade.8
There may be wage adjustment mechanisms that would lead to such delayed and
persistent effects on wages—so that the principal effects of the shock only increase
slowly during the supply shock but persist long after it ends—but these mechanisms
are unclear.
• There is no observed effect on unemployment. The various studies’ disagreement on
wage effects of the Boatlift is more striking given their agreement that the Boatlift
had no detectable effect on native unemployment (Card 1990; Peri and Yasenov
2017; Borjas and Monras 2017). It is theoretically possible for Cubans flooding the
Miami labor market to have large effects on wages but no effects on unemployment,
though this would seem to require a high degree of downward flexibility in low-skill
wages that is not supported by all strands of the labor literature (e.g. Altonji and
Devereux 2000).9 Given that the wage effect found by Borjas is so large (in some
specifications –0.30 to –0.45 log points), it is something of a puzzle that the wage
and unemployment effects are disjoint.
1.2 Sensitivity to subgroup selection
We begin by illustrating the known sensitivity of the recent Mariel Boatlift reanalyses to
subgroup selection (Peri and Yasenov 2017, Figure 8). Thereafter we propose a mechanism
by which this subgroup selection can generate discordant results.
Figure 1 illustrates the original Card result: there was no fall in low-skill wages in Miami
after 1980 relative to pre-trends or control cities. Here we define ‘low-skill’ as workers
with high school or less, the canonical definition in the labor literature.10 In the figure,
8See the discussion of Figure 2f, below.
9The higher estimates of the wage impact of the Boatlift would require flexibility in nominal wages, not
only in real wages. Cumulative consumer price inflation in Miami from July 1980 to July 1983 was 20.4%.
From: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics series CUUSA320SA0, “CPI–All Urban Consumers, All items in
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL, not seasonally adjusted.”
10Acemoğlu and Autor (2011, 1101) describe this definition as “canonical”. The early modern immi-
gration literature, as well, used ‘low skill’ or ‘less skilled’ as a synonym for workers without specialized
training (Johnson 1980), usually taken to mean workers with no college (e.g. Card 1990; Altonji and Card
1991).
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all wage averages are normalized so that the 1979 average equals zero. The thick red line
shows the annual average wage in Miami for low-skill workers—that is, all non-Cubans
age 19–65 with high school or less, who report positive annual wage and salary income,
positive weeks worked, and positive usual hours worked weekly, in the March CPS data.
The dotted lines show the confidence interval around each year’s mean. The dashed line
after 1979 shows a linear extrapolation of the Miami trend from 1972 up to and including
1979. The thin, green line shows the annual average wage in the control cities preferred by
Borjas (2017).11 Miami wages stagnated after 1979, rather than declining as before 1979,
and the trend in Miami closely resembled that in the control cities preferred by Borjas
from 1979 to 1985.
One might be concerned that the Card analysis obscures wage competition between the
Mariel migrants and Miami residents who closely resembled them. Figure 2 shows the
same analysis suggests no negative effect of the Boatlift on various subgroups of low-
skill Miami workers competing most closely with the Mariel migrants, and even a positive
effect on Hispanics. The Mariel migrants were predominantly men, essentially all Hispanic,
largely prime-age. They were roughly evenly split between workers with high school only
and those with less than high school. Figure 2a shows low-skill workers who are men.
Figure 2b shows low-skill workers who are Hispanic. Figure 2c shows low-skill workers
who are prime age (25–59). In all cases, there is a large rise (about +30%) in Miami
wages during 1981–1985 relative to the pre-trend, statistically significant in most years.
There is also a large rise (about +10–20%) relative to average wages in the Borjas control
cities, statistically significant in some years—albeit statistically insignificant in most years
(except Hispanics).
When the subgroup of workers with high school only are analyzed separately (Figure 2d),
there is a large and statistically significant rise in wages relative to the pre-trend (about
+30–40%) and relative to the Borjas control cities (about +10–20%). When the subgroup
of low-skill workers with less than high school are analyzed separately, there may be a fall
11The Card preferred control cities, chosen because they resembled Miami in employment growth “over
the late 1970s and early 1980s,” are Atlanta, Los Angeles, Houston, and Tampa-St. Petersburg. The
Borjas preferred control cities, chosen to resemble pre-1980 employment growth in Miami, are Anaheim,
Rochester, Nassau-Suffolk, and San Jose.
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(about –10 to –20%) in wages relative to the pre-trend and the Borjas control cities—but
it is not statistically precise (both are significant in 1982 only). This closely corresponds
to the core result in Peri and Yasenov (2017).
Borjas (2017) reaches a sharply different conclusion by heavily truncating the March CPS
data on low-skill workers. The Borjas sample omits women, Hispanics, workers under
age 25, workers over age 59, and workers who have finished high school. This leaves an
average of 17 observations per year during the period where he finds that largest effect
(1983–1987), that is, omitting 91% of the observations of low-skill workers in Miami during
that period (average 185 observations per year). In Borjas’s subgroup, there is a large fall
in Miami wages (about –30 to –50%) lasting several years after 1980, both relative to the
pre-1980 Miami trend and relative to the Borjas control cities (Figure 2f). The peak effect
is estimated to occur six years after the Boatlift. Peri and Yasenov (2017) attribute this
fall in wages to measurement error arising from the small size of the selected subsample.12
1.3 An explanation for subgroup sensitivity: Sample composition change
We propose that all substantial disagreement in these prior studies can be explained by
previously unreported changes in the underlying survey data. There was a sharp increase
in the number of black workers with less than high school sampled by the CPS in Miami,
coincident with the Mariel Boatlift but unrelated to it. Because black workers with less
than high school earned much less than non-black workers at the same education level,
this compositional effect generated a spurious wage decline among Miami workers with
less than high school.
Table 1 shows the number of blacks and non-blacks in the CPS samples of Miami workers
12An important source of measurement error in this setting could arise from ‘match bias’ in the CPS
(Hirsch and Schumacher 2004): Many wage observations in the CPS are imputed from wages earned by a
matched ‘donor’ worker, and the donor can be a worker from a different metropolitan area and ethnicity
in both the March CPS and the MORG. In the MORG, the donor can even be a worker from a previous
month or previous year. In principle, this could introduce substantial measurement error and attenuate
the coefficient estimates, such that the estimated wage effect would rise in absolute value if estimated only
on workers with directly observed wages. But the opposite is true in the present case: The core wage
effects measured by Borjas (2017, Table 5) decline slightly in absolute value when workers with imputed
wages are dropped (results not shown, available on request).
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with less than high school used by Borjas (2017): male non-Hispanics age 25–59, in the
first three columns. The year is the year of each CPS survey, as in Borjas (2017, Table
3). Between the 1977–1979 surveys and the post-1980 surveys there were large increases
in the fraction of black men in the sample, both in the March CPS (upper panel) and the
May/ORG CPS extracts (lower panel)—but much larger in the March CPS. In the March
CPS, the fraction of black workers roughly tripled between the survey conducted in 1979
and the survey in 1985, rising 55 percentage points (col. 3). The increase in the May/ORG
was roughly one third as large. The table shows that no such increase in sampled blacks
occurred in the control cities preferred by Card or the control cities preferred by Borjas
(cols. 4 and 5). There was also no such increase in sampled blacks for workers in Miami
with high school or less, the group analyzed by Card (col. 6).
This compositional change could produce a spurious decline in the average wage of Miami
workers with less than high school, for three reasons. The clearest reason is that Miami
experienced a large influx of low-income black Haitian workers, precisely in 1980 (Portes
and Stepick 1985; Stepick and Portes 1986). Almost all 15,000 of these Haitians had less
than high school (Portes and Stepick 1985, 495–497), and about 6,150 were male (41%,
Stepick and Portes 1986, 332).13 Before they arrived, there were only 16,940 male black
workers with less than high school in Miami in the subpopulation analyzed by Borjas.14
Thus the arrival of Haitians in 1980 alone raised the number of blacks in the Borjas
subpopulation by up to 36%. The overall compositional change through this channel
is likely greater, since Haitians continued to arrive during the early 1980s (Portes and
Stepick 1985, 495, fn 3). These Haitian blacks who arrived during 1980–82 cannot be
distinguished from U.S. blacks in the data,15 and had extremely low incomes. Household
income of the newly-arrived Haitians was $5,521 per year in 1983 (Portes and Stepick 1985,
497), compared to $17,415 for the households of otherwise observably identical black men
13The Haitians who arrived in Miami 1980–82 had an age distribution similar to that of the Mariel
migrants. The Haitians’ principal difference was that they had much less educated and were much more
likely to originate from rural areas than the Mariel migrants (Portes et al. 1986).
14In the 1980 Census 5% sample microdata (Ruggles et al. 2015), there are 847 observations in the
Miami-Hialeah metropolitan area of black male non-Hispanics age 25–59 with less than high school who
report positive income and positive weeks worked last year, living in households (pre-1990 definition) rather
than group quarters. The sampling weight implies that these observations represent a subpopulation of
16,940 black men in Miami.
15Until 1994, the Current Population Survey did not regularly report an individual’s country of birth,
so U.S. native blacks cannot be distinguished from immigrant blacks in the 1970s and 1980s.
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with less than high school in Miami in 1980.16
A second reason is the increased coverage of low-skill U.S. black men around 1980 in surveys
run by the Census Bureau, who had lower average incomes than non-blacks. Major efforts
to raise coverage of blacks, especially males, in nationally representative surveys were
spurred by political pressure in the run-up to the 1980 census. In 1978, the Levitan
Commission had quantified major undercoverage of black men in the 1970 census (Levitan
et al. 1979, 142), raising national pressure to raise coverage of that group in particular.
By 1980, Senate hearings described the Census Bureau as “embattled” and engaged in
“massive efforts to improve coverage” (U.S. Senate 1981, 1–2, 48). Efforts to respond
by improving coverage focused on low-income black men. There was particular pressure
in Miami, including a lawsuit led by then-mayor Maurice Ferré who joined leaders of a
handful of other cities in alleging large undercounts of low-income urban blacks due to
“negligence or malfeasance attributable to local Census Bureau officials.”17 The backdrop
for these pressures was the the May 1980 riots in the Liberty City and Overtown sections
of Miami, which had led to a widespread perception that Miami’s low-income blacks had
been ignored by the government (Pendleton et al. 1982).
Many of the Levitan Commission’s recommendations were implemented immediately in
and after 1980 (Hamel and Tucker 1985). These changes included additional ‘coverage
samples’ to capture more low-income black residences and greater efforts by enumerators to
identify all of the people residing in a visited residence (Brooks and Bailar 1978). Starting
in the March 1981 CPS, the Current Population Survey extracts changed the treatment
of race, because “[a]nalysis of results from the 1980 census indicated that reporting of race
was not directly comparable with CPS because of different data collection procedures.”
The degree to which this altered CPS coverage of different black subpopulations is not
recorded in publicly available documents, but these measures were taken in order to arrive
at “more precise estimates . . . for black and non-black populations” (Census Bureau 1982,
16Again using the 1980 Census 5% sample microdata (Ruggles et al. 2015), there are 810 reported
household incomes in the Miami-Hialeah metropolitan area for the households of black male non-Hispanics
age 25–59 with less than high school who report positive income and positive weeks worked last year, living
in households (pre-1990 definition) rather than group quarters. The mean of these household incomes,
weighted by the household weight, is $17,415.24.
17Maurice A. Ferré, et al. v. Philip M. Klutznick, et al. C.A. No. 80-2933, Southern District of Florida,
October 30, 1980; In Re 1980 Decennial Census Adjustment Litigation., 506 F.Supp. 648 (JPML 1981).
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13)—that is, to reduce undercounts of blacks. Because low-skill black men earned less
than low-skill non-black men, this would reduce average wages of sampled blacks.
The above reason is reinforced by a third reason: Increases in coverage of low-skill blacks
in the surveys tended to include, at the margin, lower-income blacks relative to previously
covered blacks. Contemporary efforts to improve coverage among blacks in and after 1980
clearly focused on the poorest blacks (Levitan et al. 1979, 139; U.S. Senate 1981, 82–
83; Durant and Jack 1993). Ethnographers at the time found that marginal blacks added
through more extensive survey efforts tended to be the poorest blacks—those who had been
concealed from surveyors in order to preserve welfare benefits, or those whose “transiency
and mobility” in the poorest inner-city black neighborhoods “does not fit the Census Bureau
assumption of a ‘usual residence’ ” (Hainer et al. 1988, 514). Indirect evidence for negative
selection of this kind is that within sampled workers with less than high school, years of
education fell in Miami after 1980 relative to the control cities (Appendix Table 1).18
1.4 Testing for spurious wage effects
Figure 3a illustrates how this compositional change in the samples coincides closely with
large changes in the average wage of workers with less than high school. The figure plots
the annual average wage, for Miami workers in the Borjas sample, against the fraction
of the sample that is black in each year.19 There is a very strong, negative association
between the black fraction and the average income. The line in the figure shows a simple
least-squares fit through all the datapoints. The doubling of the black fraction between
the pre-Boatlift years and the post-Boatlift years is associated with roughly a 40% decline
in the average wage (the log weekly wage falls from about 5.6 to 5.1, that is, from $270
18Another mechanism that could spuriously produce wage declines in Miami at this time, in principle,
would be a suddenly influx of U.S. blacks into the city coincidentally occurring in 1980. But tabulations
by the Census Bureau show no important change to the rate of increase of Miami’s overall population of
U.S. blacks (at all skill levels) in the years after 1980 relative to the years before 1980 (data from the full
census 1960–80 in Bureau of the Census 1982, 22; data from the CPS 1980–85 in Starsinic and Forstall
1989, 40–41). And histories of Miami’s black population mention no large and sudden surge in overall
native-born black migration to Miami in 1980 that would cause a discontinuity in the true population of
native-born blacks there (Dunn 1997).
19In Table 1 above—following Borjas (2017, Table 3)—the “Survey Year” is the year in which the survey
was conducted. Here, in Figure 3, the “Earnings Year” is the year in which reported earnings in the March
CPS were earned: the year prior to the survey year—following Borjas (2017, Table 5). The reason for this
difference is that the March CPS asks workers about their earnings in the preceding year.
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to $164). We interpret this association as largely a causal relationship, since it is not
plausibly conincidental. The change in the black fraction of the sample could not be a
compositional effect of the Boatlift itself, since all of these samples omit Hispanic blacks.
Figure 3b shows that for Miami workers with exactly high school there is a very similar
negative relation between the wage and the share black. Yet there is no fall over time in
the average wage because the share black is not increasing over time.
Figure 3c returns to the Borjas subpopulation of workers with less than high school, and
tests for compositional change for samples of those workers in the control cities preferred
by Borjas. Also among these workers, there was neither a substantial change in the race
composition of the samples around 1980 nor a substantial fall in the wage, despite a
relationship between share black and the wage that is similar to Miami’s. It likewise
suggests that if a large change in the race composition of the samples in the control cities
had occurred, it would have produced a large fall in the average wage. But no such change
occurred in the control cities, as shown in the figure and in Table 1. In all three panels
of the figure, the least-squares fit line shows a negative relationship between the fraction
black and the average wage. But only in panel (a) does the fraction black jump between
the pre- and post-Boatlift years (from 40–50% to 70–80%), and only in that panel does
the wage drastically fall (by about 0.5 log points).
This evidence suggests that the wage effects of the Mariel Boatlift estimated by Borjas
(2017) are severely biased, and that a substantial portion of those estimates is spurious.
The most straightforward approach to estimating the degree of the bias is to adapt the
analysis to adjust for the share of blacks and compare with the original results. Borjas’s
(Table 5) core results begin with yearly individual-level regressions (for workers of all
education levels in Miami and the control cities) that adjust wages for age and city, and
then average the adjusted wages for workers with less than high school by city and year.
He then performs differences-in-differences regressions at the city-year level, dropping 1980
earnings because in both CPS extracts 1980 is a mix of pre- and post-Boatlift data. The
covariates are the interactions of a dummy for Miami and dummies for three-year time
periods: their coefficients would ideally be zero for years before the Boatlift (indicating
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that the controls were similar to Miami), while their coefficients for years after the Boatlift
indicate any effect of the Boatlift. Because the city-year averages are pre-adjusted by city
and year, the resulting regressions run by Borjas test not for a difference-in-difference of the
average wage level, as Borjas incorrectly states, but instead for a difference-in-difference of
the relative wage of workers with less than high school (compared to the average worker
at any other education level).
We adapt this procedure to include controls for black in the individual-level regressions.
Table 2a shows the results for the March CPS data. The first two columns are an exact
replication of the corresponding columns of Borjas (2017, Table 5), with very large esti-
mated treatment effects on wages relative to both the Card and Borjas control cities. In
columns 3 and 4, prior to averaging within city-period cells, the wage of each individual is
adjusted using a black indicator variable whose coefficient is constrained to take the same
value for all cities, education levels, and ages, but is unique for each year. This change
reduces the magnitude of the treatment effect by roughly one third.
It is a strong assumption to constrain the black indicator coefficient to be identical for all
cities and skill levels. Empirically, the black-nonblack wage gap does vary by city and skill
level. Theoretically, there are important reasons why the black-nonblack wage gap would
be different in Miami than in the control cities. In the 1980s, blacks constitute over two
thirds of Miami’s non-Hispanic males with less than high school, but less than 10% of the
same group in the Borjas control cities (Table 1). Cities with sharply different populations
of low-skill blacks exhibit different patterns of geographic and occupational segregation
that can shape the black-nonblack wage gap. Thus, in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2a, the
coefficient on the black indicator is allowed to take unique values for each city, but is still
constrained to take the same value for all education levels. The treatment effect is more
heavily attentuated—by more than half of its original value—and is no longer statistically
significant relative to the control cities preferred by Card.
In columns 7 and 8, the coefficient on the black indicator is allowed to take unique values for
workers with less than high school in each city. The coefficient estimates in these columns
therefore represent the effect on non-blacks with less than high school. The estimates
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in these columns have the disadvantage of controlling away any additional effect that the
Mariel Boatlift might have had on the wages of blacks with less than high school compared
to non-blacks, but have the advantage that they would not be affected by changes in the
racial composition of the subsample with less than high school. In these columns the wage
effects are neither economically nor statistically significant.
Table 2b repeats the above analysis using the May/ORG CPS extract—in which larger
samples represent the same population. In these data, when we control for a black indicator
that is specific to each city, but identical across education levels (columns 5 and 6), there
is no statistically significant treatment effect relative to either the Card or Borjas control
cities. The same is true when the city-specific black indicator is allowed to take a unique
coefficient for workers with less than high school (columns 7 and 8).
The most direct way to test for wage effects in the absence of an increase in low-income
blacks in the sample, in principle, would be to simply repeat the analysis dropping blacks
from the sample. But the already small size of the samples makes this impossible in prac-
tice. Figure 4 modifies Figure 2f to show average wages for non-blacks only, in the March
CPS extract. Extremely few observations remain: an average of only four observations per
year in the years where Borjas finds the largest treatment effect (1983–1987, see Table 1).
At this point, over 98% of the original sample of low-skill workers has been discarded, and
statistical noise prevents any conclusion about Miami wage trends.
In sum, the core regressions of Borjas (2017) are fragile when adjusted to control for a
city-specific black indicator. When this is done, there is only a statistically significant wage
effect in the March CPS extract but not the May/ORG, and even in the March extract,
the significance of the effect depends critically on the choice of control cities. When the
city-specific black indicator is allowed to vary by education group, there is no significant
treatment effect at all. This suggests that the degree of bias in the original Borjas (2017)
result is high. The analysis cannot be carried out separately for the subsample of blacks
because that subsample is greatly contaminated by simultaneous, unrelated compositional
change, and the analysis cannot be carried out separately for non-blacks because minuscule
sample sizes prevent it. Overall, the evidence is compatible with a model in which the
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Mariel Boatlift caused a modest fall in the wages of this subpopulation of roughly –2% to
–8% in the few years immediately after the Boatlift, but it is also compatible with a model
in which this effect was zero.20
1.5 Reconciliation of prior findings
Prior studies of the Mariel Boatlift emphasize different subgroups. Card (1990) focuses
on workers with high school or less. Borjas (2017) focuses on a small subset of those
workers, non-Hispanic men with less than high school, except those under 25 or over 59.
Peri and Yasenov (2017) focus on all non-Cubans with less than high school. Their sharply
different results can be explained by large contemporaneous changes in the composition
of the small subsample used by Borjas (2017), changes that were not substantial in the
larger subsamples used by Card (1990) and by Peri and Yasenov (2017).
This can also explain several other features of these previous findings. 1) It can explain
why Borjas (2017) and Peri and Yasenov (2017) find a wage effect roughly three times
larger in the March CPS than in the May/ORG extract: The change in racial composition
is about three times larger in the March CPS than in the May/ORG extract (Table 1). 2) It
can explain why all prior studies find no effect of the Mariel Boatlift on unemployment:
There was no difference between black and nonblack unemployment rates among male non-
Hispanic less-than-high-school workers in Miami, despite the large difference between black
and non-black wages there (Table 3), so a change in racial composition would not change
average unemployment in the sample. 3) It can explain why the wage effects estimated
by Borjas (2017) persist into the period 1985–1988, by which time the supply shock of
Cubans had subsided. The shift in racial composition of the sample continues—and in
fact increases—through the years 1985–1988. 4) It can explain why Borjas (2017) finds
larger effects in his preferred control cities than in Card’s (1990) preferred control cities:
Coverage of blacks fell in the Borjas control cities, even hitting zero in 1983, but did not
fall in the Card control cities.
20The coefficient estimate in Table 2a column 8, row 1981–83 is –8%. This is the most negative coefficient
estimate in columns 7 or 8 in either Table 2a or Table 2b. The corresponding coefficient in Table 2b is
–2%. Several of the coefficient estimates in columns 7 and 8 of both tables are positive. None of the
coefficients is statistically signficant.
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2 Comparing the Mariel Boatlift to other refugee waves in Israel, France,
and across Europe
Recent reanalysis has also challenged earlier results on the labor market impacts of three
other large refugee waves—in France (Hunt 1992), Israel (Friedberg 2001), and across Eu-
rope (Angrist and Kugler 2003)—alongside the Mariel Boatlift in a parallel instrumental-
variables framework. For all four of these cases, Borjas and Monras (2017) seek to improve
on causal identification in the original studies with an instrumental variable closely related
to the instrument introduced by Altonji and Card (1991). They run a series of regressions
of the form
∆ logwrs = θr + θs + ηmrs + εrs, (1)
where wrs is the wage or other labor market outcome for native workers with skill s in
region r; θr and θs are region and skill fixed effects; Lrst is the native population with skill
s in region r at time t, mrs ≡ Mrs1Lrs1 is the size of the refugee supply shock relative to the
native population of skill s in region r at time 1; time 1 is after the refugee influx, time
0 is before it; the coefficient η is to be estimated and ε is an error term. In one of the
reanalyses, r indexes occupations rather than geographic areas.21 Because refugees’ choice
of geographic destination can be endogenous, the authors instrument for the refugee shock
Mrs1
Lrs1
with prior migration to that region Mrs0Lrs0 , resting on the idea that previous migrants
attract new migrants to the same area (following Altonji and Card 1991).
A potential weakness of this instrumental variables approach lies in the fact that the
native population of each region changes little over the short time periods in question, thus
both the instrument and the endogenous variable have a common divisor
(
Lrs1 ≈ Lrs0
)
.
This can generate spurious correlation between the ratios mrs1 and mrs0 regardless of the
numerator, as first observed by Pearson (1896). In the colorful example of Neyman (1952,
21This specification varies between the reanalyses. In the France reanalysis, for example, location fixed
effects θr are omitted (see discussion in subsection 2.2). The reason given for omitting these fixed effects
in the France reanalysis is that including them affects the results: it “makes the coefficients for the French
repatriates supply shock very unstable” (Borjas and Monras 2017, 44). Also in the France reanalysis, the
labor market outcome is employment but not wage (wage is unavailable in the original data); but in the
Israel reanalysis it is wage but not employment. In the Israel reanalysis the index r is across occupations
rather than regions, due to Israel’s small geographic extent. Alternative forms of all regressions are run
controlling as well for the term η log Lrs1
Lrs0
, motivated by theory, but all results are substantively unaffected.
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143), one could conclude that storks bring babies by correlating storks-per-woman with
babies-per-woman across any set of geographic areas. The variables would correlate well
by construction, due to their common divisor.22
This problem, highlighted more recently by Kronmal (1993), affects instrumental variables
as well as standard regression analysis (Bazzi and Clemens 2013). One would find storks-
per-woman to be a strong instrument for babies-per-woman even if storks are irrelevant to
babies, and could use that framework to show spuriously that babies cause any regional
outcome that is correlated with the number of women in the region.
The problem can be most simply revealed by taking an instrumental variable regression of
this type with an economically meaningful variable in the numerator of the instrument, and
replacing that numerator with storks—or any other irrelevant placebo. Robustness to such
a change is a telltale indicator of a spurious result in the original instrumental variables
regression, one form of what has been called the “blunt instruments” problem (Bazzi and
Clemens 2013). Robustness to this placebo substitution does not invalidate the result,
but demonstrates that the result requires further scrutiny to demonstrate that the original
instrument contains identifying information beyond variance in the denominator (which
may not be a valid instrument by itself). A recent and more general literature suggests that
instrumental variable results in practical application are often spurious, with between a
third and half of instrumental variable results published in leading journals falsely rejecting
the null due to their treatment of standard errors (Young 2017).
Kronmal (1993) proposes a specification correction for this problem in an Ordinary Least
Squares setting that we here adapt to the instrumental variables setting. The robustness
test he proposes is to simply split the ratio variable into two separate variables, while
accounting for the nonlinear relationship between numerator and denominator.23 In the
stork example, a regression of log
( babies
woman
)
on log
( storks
woman
)
will give a spurious coefficient,
but a regression of log(babies) on both log(storks) and log(women) will give the correct
22See also inter alia Pendleton et al. (1979, 1983); Jackson and Somers (1991); Wiseman (2009).
23Kronmal considers a simple ratio and proposes controlling for the reciprocal of the denominator. In
the present case the ratio is logged, so the equivalent is to control for the log of the denominator (which
is equivalent to controlling for the log of the reciprocal of the denominator).
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positive coefficient on women and the correct null coefficient on storks. We modify that
correction in one way: Because here the refugee shock variable frequently takes value zero,
the log transformation would truncate those observations, so we instead use the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation.24
We therefore modify the regression (1) with the Kronmal correction to
∆ logwrs = θr + θs + η
(
asinhMrs1
)
+ η′
(
asinhLrs1
)
+ εrs, (2)
where asinh is the inverse hyperbolic sine and where the endogenous refugee supply shock
(asinhMrs1) is instrumented by the predetermined stock of prior migrants (asinhMrs0).25
2.1 Israel reanalysis
Friedberg (2001) studies a large and sudden influx of Soviet refugees to Israel between
1990 and 1994, large enough to raise Israel’s population by 12%. She uses information on
migrants’ former occupations in their home countries to construct an instrument for the
occupations they take in Israel, and finds “no adverse impact of immigration on native
outcomes” within occupations. Borjas and Monras (2017) reanalyze the episode using
instead the Altonji and Card instrument based on prior migration flows into education-
occupation cells inside Israel, and instead find large detrimental effects of the migration
on Israel natives’ wages.
Table 4 carries out the placebo test described above on the Borjas and Monras application
of the prior-flows instrument to the Israel refugee wave. First, we construct a placebo
instrument that contains no information about prior flows of migrants into the education-
by-occupation cells in the reanalysis. We take the pre-influx Soviet immigrant stock across
occupations, by skill group—and generate Poisson-distributed white noise with the same
24Regression coefficients on variables transformed with the inverse hyperbolic sine can be interpreted
identically to those using the traditional log transformation (as approximating percent changes) since
d
dx
asinhx = 1√
1+x2
≈ 1/x = d
dx
lnx,∀x & 2. But unlike the log transformation, the inverse hyperbolic
sine has desirable properties near zero and is defined at zero (asinh 0 = 0). See Burbidge et al. (1988);
MacKinnon and Magee (1990).
25Note again that in this Israel case only, subscript r indexes occupations rather than regions.
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mean as the real numerator Mrs0. The means of these placebo numerators
∼
M rs0 for each
skill group are shown in Table 4a. We then construct a placebo instrument by dividing
that white-noise numerator ∼M rs0 by the same divisor as the true instrument (Lrs0). The
resulting placebo instrument ∼mrs contains no information about prior migration flows.
Second, we replicate the Borjas and Monras (2017, Table 1, cols.1, 3) reanalysis of the
Israel case. In Table 4b, columns 1 and 3, we exactly replicate Borjas and Monras’s
(2017) findings with their original instrument. Third, we replace the Borjas and Monras
instrument with our placebo instrument. Columns 2 and 4 use the placebo instrument,
without changing anything else in the analysis. The placebo instrument achieves a result
that is similar—and actually increases in magnitude and statistical significance. In both
columns the estimated detrimental effect of Soviet migrants on native wages is a bit larger
in absolute value than in the original study; in column 2 the result is more statistically
significant than in the original.26
Identification of the effect of the refugee shock ostensibly rests on the distribution of prior
migration across occupations within skill cells. But when all information about prior
migration is purged from the instrument, the result stands, and in fact grows stronger.
This suggests that the original result could be spurious, driven by irrelevant relationships
between wage trends for natives in different skill cells and the population size of those cells
(the denominator of the instrument).
We apply the Kronmal specification correction to the instrumental variables regressions,
splitting the refugee shock numerator and the population size into two separate variables
in the second stage. Then the absolute magnitude of the refugee shock (in number of
people) can be strongly and validly instrumented with the absolute magnitude of lagged
migration to the region or occupation in question.
26Instrumentation is not as strong using the placebo instrument. But the degree of potential bias from
weak instrumentation is around 25% of the coefficient estimate (Stock et al. 2005)—in the absence of
which the placebo coefficient would match the original coefficient even more closely. Furthermore the
Anderson-Rubin (1949) F -test for the significance of the refugee shock in the second stage, a test that
is robust to weak instrumentation, rejects the hypothesis that the coefficient is zero at the 5% level in
column 2.
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Table 5 shows that the second-stage coefficient on the émigré supply shock is statistically
indistinguishable from zero under the Kronmal correction. The first column of the table
precisely replicates the original result in Borjas and Monras (2017, Table 6). The second
column shows that the result is nearly identical when the ratio measure of the supply shock
undergoes the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. The third column shows regression
(2), in which the current migration shock is instrumented with true lagged migration into
the cell. The coefficient on the refugee supply shock becomes indistinguishable from zero,
and its magnitude—adjusted to be comparable to column 1 (in square brackets)—falls in
absolute value from –0.616 to –0.284.27 Instrumentation remains very strong in column
3, with a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) F statistic over 14, but the weak-instrument robust
Anderson-Rubin (1949) F -test fails by a wide margin to reject the hypothesis that the
second-stage coefficient on the refugee shock is zero.28
The last column of Table 5 offers an explanation for this pattern, by simply regressing the
absolute magnitude of the refugee supply shock (asinhMrs1) on the absolute magnitude of
the population in each cell (asinhLrs1). The coefficient of 1.15 is indistinguishable from
unity, and 72% of the variance in the size of the refugee supply shock is explained simply
by the size of the native population in each education-occupation cell. That is, most of
the information contained in the size of the refugee supply shock is contained in the size
of the native population in each cell; the denominator of the original instrument contains
almost all information about prior flows. Thus any coincidental relationship between wage
trends in some occupation-skill cells and the absolute size of that cell could produce a
second-stage coefficient that rejects the null of zero. When this possibility is eliminated
by the Kronmal correction, in column 3 of Table 5, the second stage coefficient cannot be
distinguished from zero.
Of course the original instrument used by Friedberg (2001), also constructed from a ratio,
could be vulnerable to the same problem. Thus in Tables 6 and 7 we repeat the placebo
27This is done, here and in the tables to follow, by multiplying the Kronmal coefficient by 1−p
p
, where
p is the immigrant share: here −0.0348 · 1−0.109
0.109
= −0.284. See Appendix C for proof. The results are
substantively unchanged when controlling for log Lrs1
Lrs0
, as Borjas and Monras (2017) do in some specifica-
tions.
28This is the proper test for the present just-identified setting of one endogenous variable and a single
instrument.
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test and Kronmal correction for Friedberg’s original result. Friedberg’s instrument is not
the lagged ratio in Israel of Soviet émigrés in each skill-occupation cell per Israeli in that
cell used by Borjas and Monras, but rather the number of émigrés in each skill-occupation
cell prior to migration, in their home countries, per lagged Israeli in that cell in Israel.
Table 6a shows the means, by education group, of the Poisson-distributed white noise
generated to replace the numerator of the instrument.
In Table 6b, column 1 we then exactly replicate Friedberg’s core instrumental variable
result, a positive impact on native wages that is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Column 2 shows that Friedberg’s result, unlike Borjas and Monras’s, cannot be reproduced
with the placebo instrument. The second-stage coefficient now fails to reject a wide range
of negative and positive effects on wages. The weak-instrument robust Anderson-Rubin
F -test fails by a wide margin to reject the hypothesis that the second-stage coefficient
is zero. This implies that the original instrumental variable used by Friedberg contained
identifying information in the numerator, as intended.
Thus we do not expect the Kronmal specification correction to greatly alter Friedberg’s
core result, and this is indeed what we observe in Table 7. There, as in Table 5, the
first column replicates the original result and the second shows that it is unchanged under
the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the immigration shock ratio. The third
column splits that ratio into its numerator and denominator (each in inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation, asinh), instrumenting for the numerator only (asinh of the 1994 Soviet
émigré stock in Israel in each cell) with the asinh of the pre-migration size of that cell given
the migrants’ previous occupations in their home countries (the numerator of the Friedberg
instrument). The second-stage coefficient remains positive but is no longer statistically
significant—though the weak-instrument robust Anderson-Rubin F -test does reject at the
11% level the hypothesis that the second-stage coefficient on the endogenous migrant shock
is zero. The magnitude of the coefficient estimate in column 3, adjusted to be comparable
with column 1 (in square brackets), is 0.572.29
This departs slightly from Friedberg’s original finding that any zero or negative wage
29This is calculated, as above, by: 0.0780 · 1−0.12
0.12
= 0.572.
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impact could be rejected at the 5% level. But it does remain in accordance with Friedberg’s
(2001, 1403) interpretation of that finding: “we cannot reject the hypothesis that the mass
migration of Russians to Israel did not affect the earnings or employment of native Israelis.”
2.2 France reanalysis
Hunt (1992) studies the effects on French wages and native unemployment of the arrival
from Algeria in 1962 of 900,000 people of European (and Jewish) origin (e.g. Festy 1970;
Guillon 1974). Algeria’s independence in that year led almost the entire population of
European origin to flee to France, along with about 140,000 Muslims of Arab and Berber
origin (Roux 1991, 230), mostly illiterate “Harkis” who faced reprisals for having fought for
France in the war of independence. Using variation by department (province) and time, she
finds that the arrival of the repatriates raised French native unemployment by “at most 0.3
percentage points.” This result stems from the fact that the repatriates represented 1.6%
of the 1968 labor force and that Hunt finds a one percentage point increase in repatriates
in the labor force increased the unemployment rate by 0.19 percentage point; to a very
close approximation 0.19 is also the effect of an increase in the labor force of one percent
due to the repatriates (see Appendix C). Hunt does not study the effect of the Harkis.
Using variation across region (each containing several departments), education and time,
along with the prior-flows instrumental variable strategy, Borjas and Monras (2017) reana-
lyze the impact of the repatriates and attempt to analyze for the first time the effect of the
Harkis. While Hunt had access to data only at the department level, Borjas and Monras
(2017, 5) use individual–level data. They find that a one percent increase in population
due to repatriates raised the unemployment rate of similarly educated male natives by a
statistically significant 0.09 percentage point (Borjas and Monras Table 10, cols. 3 and 4).
Although the effect estimated is conceptually slightly different (see Appendix C), it seems
reasonable to consider this result to be similar to Hunt’s, given standard errors, suggesting
Borjas and Monras’s exclusion of native women may be innocuous.30
30This similarity may be coincidental, however, since the data used by Borjas and Monras identify
neither the repatriates nor the Harkis. Repatriates are imputed from the data rather than indicated in
the data. The authors’ imputation identifies 1.4 million repatriates, more than 50% too many, with their
sample including more than half the Harkis—the 84,000 who had acquired French nationality by 1968
(Roux 1991, 226)—and non–repatriate French nationals returning from residence abroad.
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Borjas and Monras also find that a one percent increase in the population due to the arrival
of Algerian nationals raised the unemployment rate of similarly educated male natives by
a statistically significant 0.25 percentage point (Borjas and Monras Table 10 columns 3
and 4). This is almost three times the effect they find for the imputed repatriates, though
similar in magnitude to the Hunt estimate of the impact of the repatriates (0.19), given
standard errors. This similarity is obscured in the discussion in Borjas and Monras, as the
magnitude the authors emphasize is the product of the 0.25 coefficient and the share of
Algerians in the lowest education group in the most affected cities, a much larger number.
Probably only half the authors’ sample of 160,000 Algerians are actually Harkis, since
they count 84,000 Harkis as repatriates, with the remainder being economic migrants from
Algeria.31
The estimated effects thus do not differ statistically significantly between Hunt (1992) and
Borjas and Monras, nor are the differences in the point estimates very large. Nevertheless,
we scrutinize the use of lagged migration as an instrument in both papers, beginning with
Borjas and Monras. We first repeat the reanalysis of subsection 2.1, above, focusing on
the Algerian nationals. In Table 8a we show the means of Poisson-distributed white noise
∼
M rs0 with the same mean as the prior stocks of Algerian migrants Mrs0 across French
regions within skill cells. Table 8b shows that the detrimental effects estimated for natives
are larger using the placebo instrument ∼mrs0, as in the Israel case. The first column exactly
replicates the core result in Borjas and Monras Table 10: IV coefficients of 0.09 for the
repatriates and 0.25 for the Algerians. In the second column, we replace the true Algerian
prior stock instrument with the placebo: the coefficient estimate rises to 0.42 and retains
high statistical significance.32
In column 3, we drop the French-citizen repatriate shock from the original regression in
column 1, showing that the coefficient estimate on the Algerian national shock is essen-
tially unchanged at 0.28. In column 4, we then replace the true Algerian prior migrant
stock instrument with the placebo instrument. Again the coefficient estimate retains high
31Economic migrants are described by e.g. Roux (1991, 255).
32The standard error on the placebo instrument of column 2 is much higher than in the Borjas and
Monras original, but the weak instrument-robust Anderson-Rubin F -test strongly rejects the hypothesis
that the second-stage coefficient is zero.
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statistical significance, rising in magnitude to 0.44, with instrumentation stronger than in
column 2 (the Kleibergen-Paap F -statistic rises to 5.3). Column 5 shows that this result
is unaltered by controlling for the interperiod change in the native population (following
Borjas and Monras). As in the case of Russian migration to Israel, therefore, the strategy
for identifying the causal relationship between the refugee inflow and native labor market
outcomes is potentially flawed.
In Table 9, we carry out the Kronmal specification correction using equation (2) just
as was done for Israel above. The first column precisely replicates the core result using
the original analytic methods for Algerian nationals in isolation (Table 8b, column 3).
Column 2 shows that this finding is identical when the ratio measure of the migrant
shock (and its instrument) undergo the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Column
3 shows that under the Kronmal specification correction, with strong instrumentation (a
Kleibergen-Paap F -statistic of 42), the coefficient on the Algerian shock is still positive
and statistically significant, with a magnitude of 0.0023. Column 4 then controls for
the concurrent repatriate shock, instrumented by the lagged repatriate stock: this is the
Kronmal-corrected equivalent of Table 8b, column 1. The coefficient on the Algerian
shock is positive and statistically significant but falls to 0.0018; this implies that a one
percent increase in the population due to the Algerians raised unemployment by about
0.23 percentage point.33 In square brackets we convert this to a value comparable to
the Borjas and Monras coefficient: if Algerians increase the population by one percent,
unemployment rises 0.23 percentage point.34 The adjusted coefficient for repatriates is
also similar to the Borjas and Monras specification estimate of 0.04.
There is thus general agreement between all of the findings considered: the original results
of Hunt, the reanalysis of Borjas and Monras, and the results with the specification correc-
tion. For the Algerian-national shock, not studied by Hunt, both Borjas and Monras and
Table 9 here imply that if Algerians increase the population by one percent, unemploy-
ment rises by 0.23–0.24 percentage point. For the French-national repatriate shock, Hunt’s
33As above, this is calculated as 0.00182 · 1−0.008
0.008
= 0.226.
34In the last column, we regress the absolute magnitude of the Algerian supply shock (asinhMrs1) on
the absolute magnitude of the population in each cell (asinhLrs1). 81% of the variance in the refugee
shock is explained by the size of the cell.
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findings cannot be statistically distinguished from Borjas and Monras’s finding that a one
percent increase in population due to repatriates raised native unemployment by 0.09 per-
centage point, though this result is not robust to the inclusion of the same regional fixed
effects used in the other reanalyses, and the result is not statistically significant in the
Kronmal-corrected specification used here.
Hunt also uses a potentially problematic instrument: the share of early (1954–1962) repa-
triates as a share of the population, used to instrument 1962–1968 repatriates as a share of
the labor force. Like the original instrument used in Friedberg’s study of Israel, this ratio
instrument could be subject to the same problems considered above. However, in addition
to this instrument, Hunt uses the department average temperature: repatriates tended
to settle in southern France where the climate was more similar to that of Algeria. We
reproduce Hunt’s main unemployment coefficient of 0.195 (Hunt Table 3 column 4) in our
Table 10 column 1.35 An obvious robustness check is simply to drop the lagged migration
instrument and instrument with temperature alone: this is shown in our column 2. The
coefficient drops to 0.120 with a slightly larger standard error, which renders the coefficient
statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, we can rule out that a percentage point increase in
repatriate’s share in the population increases unemployment by more than 0.31 percent-
age point. To render the coefficient comparable to the Borjas and Monras coefficient an
adjustment is necessary (multiplying the coefficient by one minus the share of repatriates),
an almost identical value shown in square brackets in column 2.
Instead of dropping the lagged migration instrument, we can instead drop the tempera-
ture instrument so as to pursue comparisons with Borjas and Monras. Column 3 shows
that the coefficient of 0.209 is similar to Hunt’s original coefficient of 0.195. In column 4,
we take the inverse hyperbolic sine of both the repatriate share and its instrument, and
obtain the same result as in column 3. In column 4, we control separately for the inverse
hyperbolic sine of the 1968 number of repatriates and the 1968 labor force, instrumenting
the former with the inverse hyperbolic sine of the 1962 number of repatriates. The coef-
ficient of interest is a statistically significant 0.00254. Thus, as shown in square brackets,
if repatriates increase the size of the labor force by one percent, the unemployment rate
35This uses robust standard errors, which Hunt did not.
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increases by 0.16 percentage point. This Kronmal-corrected specification using the lagged
migration instrument thus yields a point estimate very similar to the point estimate using
temperature as an instrument in column 2, a slightly smaller effect than found by Hunt or
by Borjas and Monras. The estimates are all statistically similar, however, given standard
errors.36
2.3 Europe reanalysis
Angrist and Kugler (2003) study the effects of an influx of refugees from the Balkan War
on 18 European countries during the 1990s. They find that a sudden increase in the
migrant stock of one percentage point raises native unemployment by 0.83 percentage
point. Borjas and Monras (2017) reanalyze the episode in seven of those European coun-
tries (Austria, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Switzerland), again using
the prior-migration instrument. They likewise find a detrimental effect on native unem-
ployment, though much smaller in magnitude: an increase in the migrant stock of one
percentage point raises native unemployment by 0.49 percentage points. This is larger
than the effect found for France.
In this case there is little disagreement between the original study by Angrist and Kugler
(2003) and the reanalysis by Borjas and Monras (2017). Both find that the refugee wave
they study substantially displaced natives in the labor market, though estimates in both
are statistically imprecise. Angrist and Kugler (2003, F328) warn of identification prob-
lems and statistical imprecision in their instrumental variables estimates and recommend
interpreting those estimates as an upper bound on the true effect. The instrumental vari-
able estimates of Borjas and Monras (2017) for unemployment are statistically insignificant
even at the 10% level.
Nevertheless, we proceed with the same placebo test as above to test the robustness of
these findings. Table 11a shows the means of the placebo numerator ∼M rs0 by country.
Table 11b replicates the core result in Borjas and Monras (2017, Table 13), and then
36In column 6, we regress the transformed number of 1962–1968 repatriates (asinhMrs1) on the trans-
formed number in the labor force (asinhLrs1). 80% of the variance in the refugee shock is explained by
the size of the department labor force.
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reproduces it using the placebo instrument ∼mrs0. As in the Israel and France cases above,
the result strengthens when the placebo is used: the coefficient estimate rises somewhat,
and it is statistically significant at the 10% level in column 2 (unlike the estimate in the
original).
Table 12 carries out the Kronmal correction as above. Column 1 replicates the original
result, column 2 shows that it is identical under the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation,
and column 3 carries out the Kronmal correction instrumenting with the lagged migrant
stock. The coefficient estimate is negative and statistically insignificant, with a magnitude
(adjusted in square brackets, as above, to be comparable to the column 1 coefficient) of
−0.26.37 Instrumentation is quite weak, with a Kleibergen-Paap F statistic of just 1.5.
However the weak instrument-robust Anderson-Rubin (1949) F -test strongly rejects the
hypothesis that the second-stage coefficient is zero—suggesting that some information is
indeed contained in the negative second-state coefficient, and failing to show that the
Balkan supply shock raised unemployment in refugees’ destination regions.
This result is discordant with Angrist and Kugler, but only to a limited degree. Their OLS
regressions find a “small” but statistically significant detrimental effect of Balkan refugees
on native unemployment, but their instrumental variables estimates are mostly statistically
insignificant and exhibit a fragility that, the authors find, “suggests these estimates are
probably driven by forces other than increased immigration” (Angrist and Kugler 2003,
F302, F322). The result here is also only mildly discordant with the effect estimated by
Borjas and Monras (2017), which is detrimental but statistically insignificant.
2.4 The Mariel Boatlift again
Borjas and Monras (2017) also revisit the impact of the Mariel Boatlift—differently from
Borjas (2017)—adding variation across education groups and using the same instrumental
variables regression specification across area-skill cells in equation (1). They concur with
Card (1990) that the Mariel Boatlift had no detrimental impact on native employment.
But like Borjas (2017), they find large negative wage impacts.
37Calculated, as above by: −0.0132 · 1−0.05
0.05
= −0.26.
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The above reanalysis of the Mariel Boatlift episode, however, likewise implies that the
Borjas and Monras (2017) results on the Mariel Boatlift are explained by irrelevant com-
positional shifts in the underlying data. This is because the entire result in Borjas and
Monras’s city-skill cell regressions depends on a single cell: workers with less-than-high-
school in Miami. Table 13 demonstrates this: Column 1 exactly replicates the core Mariel
Boatlift result in Borjas and Monras. Column 2 shows that the negative effect on native
wages vanishes if a single data point is dropped: less-than-high-school in Miami. The same
is true without any skill cell in Miami (col. 3) or without the less-than-high-school skill
group in any city (col. 4).
Because the Borjas and Monras result for the Mariel Boatlift depends entirely on the
decline in wages observed for the less-than-high-school subpopulation in Miami—which
is identical to the subpopulation in Borjas (2017)—this means that the core problems of
subsample sensitivity and compositional changes discussed in section 1 equally explain the
different estimates of wage impacts in Borjas and Monras (2017) relative to Card (1990).
And for employment impacts there is no discrepancy to explain: Both studies find no
impact on employment.
Table 13 furthermore shows that the effect in Miami estimated by Borjas and Monras is
absent among Hispanics. Column 5 reproduces their original result when city-skill cells
with no Hispanic observations are omitted from the regression, and column 6 shows that—
in the same sample—the result is absent when the wage changes within city-skill cells are
estimated for Hispanic workers only. Instrumentation remains very strong (Kleibergen-
Paap F statistic of 1965) but the second-stage coefficient on the supply shock is statistically
insignificant, and the Anderson-Rubin F -test has a p-value of 0.76.
3 Discussion
Reanalysis of prior results often advances social science (Clemens 2017). Recent reanalyses
of four early results on the labor market effects of refugee waves have reached conclusions
markedly different from the original studies in two cases (Miami and Israel) and similar
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to the original studies in the other two cases (France and Europe). The origin of the
discrepancies has not previously been clarified in a way that can assist researchers in
reconciling these findings.
We offer simple and transparent methodological reasons for the discrepancies in this
refugee-wave literature. For the Mariel Boatlift, all important discrepancies between the
original analysis and reanalyses can be explained by the sensitivity of the results to the
selection of small subsamples, often without a clear theoretical basis. In one small sub-
sample that has received focus, there was a large, simultaneous, and irrelevant change
in the racial composition of the original survey data. For the arrival of Soviet refugees
in Israel, all important discrepancies between the original analysis and reanalysis can be
explained by specification choices in the construction of the instrumental variable. For the
refugee waves from Algeria to France and from the Balkans throughout Europe, there is
little substantive discrepancy between the original studies and reanalyses. But even the
limited discrepancies are reduced by the same specification correction to the construction
of the instrumental variable, as shown in Appendix Table 2.
After accounting for the potential for spurious results from compositional change within
subgrouped data and from the ratio-correlation problem for constructed instruments, the
evidence from refugee waves collectively supports the existing consensus that the impact
of immigration on average native-born workers is small. It does not support claims of large
detrimental impacts on workers with less than high school education.
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Figure 1: Average low-skill wages in Miami: March CPS
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Thick red line shows average wage in Miami, with dotted line showing 95% confidence interval for the annual
mean, calculated using Supplement Weight. Dashed line shows post-1980 continuation of pre-1980 linear trend in
Miami. Thin green line shows average wage of same type of workers in the control cities preferred by Borjas (2017):
Anaheim, Rochester, Nassau-Suffolk, and San Jose, calculated using Supplement Weight. Data from March CPS.
‘Earnings year’ is the year prior to the survey year, following Borjas (2017). ‘Low-skill’ means workers with high
school or less. Wages are for non-Cuban workers age 19–65 with high school or less, who report positive annual
wage and salary income, positive weeks worked, and positive usual hours worked weekly.
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Figure 2: Average low-skill wages in Miami: March CPS subgroups
(a) Men only
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(b) Hispanics only
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(d) High school only
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(f) Borjas subsample
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March CPS data. ‘Earnings year’ is year before survey year. ‘Low-skill’: high school or less. ‘Borjas subsample’:
omits Hispanics, females, age <25, age >59, and high school only. ‘Workers’ report positive annual wage & salary
income, positive weeks worked, and positive usual hours worked weekly. Thick red line: annual average wage in
Miami, with 95% confidence interval, using Supplement Weight. Dashed line: pre-1980 linear trend in Miami. Thin
green line: average wage of same type of workers in Borjas control cities, using Supplement Weight.
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Table 1: Blacks in CPS subsamples
Miami
Card
control
cities
Borjas
control
cities
Miami
Less than high school HSor less
Survey
year
N
black
N non-
black Fraction black
March CPS
1977 11 12 0.479 0.267 0.028 0.408
1978 10 16 0.372 0.343 0.086 0.394
1979 8 14 0.363 0.304 0.135 0.442
1980 9 8 0.630 0.317 0.107 0.505
1981 11 7 0.663 0.279 0.073 0.512
1982 11 9 0.653 0.341 0.019 0.456
1983 17 10 0.673 0.284 0.000 0.465
1984 11 7 0.634 0.266 0.135 0.363
1985 14 2 0.910 0.276 0.180 0.541
1986 11 4 0.753 0.295 0.098 0.569
1987 13 3 0.822 0.335 0.052 0.605
1988 13 5 0.767 0.198 0.237 0.543
1989 9 8 0.610 0.289 0.229 0.533
1990 10 6 0.728 0.327 0.115 0.541
May/ORG CPS
1977 10 6 0.660 0.348 0.097 0.509
1978 6 6 0.534 0.322 0.121 0.474
1979 34 22 0.600 0.290 0.123 0.471
1980 35 20 0.644 0.299 0.109 0.534
1981 34 17 0.703 0.301 0.091 0.596
1982 27 12 0.720 0.300 0.068 0.551
1983 33 17 0.679 0.311 0.095 0.474
1984 28 20 0.604 0.309 0.163 0.449
1985 22 4 0.862 0.292 0.121 0.650
1986 27 9 0.783 0.307 0.078 0.567
1987 28 18 0.646 0.332 0.055 0.533
1988 26 11 0.745 0.255 0.087 0.571
1989 24 13 0.683 0.321 0.041 0.567
1990 20 18 0.572 0.287 0.112 0.519
Year shows year the survey was conducted, matching Borjas (2017, Table 3A). All samples include only male non-
Hispanic workers age 25–59. March CPS black fraction calculated using Supplement weight, May/ORG calculated
using earnings weight. Unweighted fractions are similar. The Card preferred control cities are Atlanta, Los Angeles,
Houston, and Tampa-St. Petersburg; the Borjas preferred control cities are Anaheim, Rochester, Nassau-Suffolk,
and San Jose.
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Table 2: Reanalysis of Borjas (2017), Table 5: with black indicator
(a) March CPS extract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Add indicator for black
Exact replication Nationwide By city By city-less than HS
Control
cities: Card Borjas Card Borjas Card Borjas Card Borjas
1981–83 −0.204∗∗∗ −0.290∗∗∗ −0.121 −0.194∗∗∗ −0.096 −0.174∗∗ 0.001 −0.078
(0.076) (0.073) (0.078) (0.070) (0.081) (0.072) (0.062) (0.061)
1984–86 −0.368∗∗∗ −0.454∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗ −0.301∗∗∗ −0.137 −0.227∗∗∗ 0.109∗ −0.001
(0.060) (0.059) (0.072) (0.053) (0.083) (0.058) (0.063) (0.059)
1987–89 −0.329∗∗∗ −0.303∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗ −0.237∗∗∗ −0.135 −0.149∗∗ −0.025 −0.049
(0.081) (0.072) (0.093) (0.071) (0.089) (0.066) (0.098) (0.070)
1990–92 −0.026 −0.056 0.094 0.025 0.105 0.037 0.220 0.121
(0.072) (0.123) (0.086) (0.117) (0.089) (0.112) (0.134) (0.103)
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
(b) May/ORG CPS extract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Add indicator for black
Exact replication Nationwide By city By city-less than HS
Control
cities: Card Borjas Card Borjas Card Borjas Card Borjas
1981–83 −0.075∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.047 −0.104∗∗ 0.005 −0.056 0.036 −0.025
(0.026) (0.049) (0.029) (0.046) (0.034) (0.040) (0.034) (0.044)
1984–86 −0.069 −0.116∗ −0.024 −0.079 −0.001 −0.053 0.016 −0.033
(0.057) (0.065) (0.067) (0.060) (0.063) (0.047) (0.051) (0.047)
1987–89 −0.106∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.074∗ −0.137∗∗ −0.046 −0.101 0.051 0.015
(0.036) (0.064) (0.039) (0.064) (0.042) (0.067) (0.053) (0.074)
1990–92 0.019 −0.070 0.069 −0.041 0.105∗ −0.004 0.162∗∗ 0.039
(0.041) (0.062) (0.044) (0.070) (0.055) (0.076) (0.061) (0.078)
N 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
Difference-in-difference regressions with pre-treatment period 1977–79. Year 1980 omitted since it includes both
pre-treatment and post-treatment observations, as in Borjas (2017, Table 5). Unit of observation is city-year.
Dependent variable is log weekly real wage. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Sample is working non-Hispanic males age 25–59 with less than high school. ‘HS’ is high school. The Card
preferred control cities are Atlanta, Los Angeles, Houston, and Tampa-St. Petersburg; the Borjas preferred control
cities are Anaheim, Rochester, Nassau-Suffolk, and San Jose. ‘Nationwide’ means coefficient on black indicator is
constrained to take the same value for all cities and education levels; ‘by city’ means coefficient on black indicator
takes a unique value for all blacks in each city; ‘by city-less than HS’ means coefficient on black indicator takes a
unique value for blacks with less than high school in each city.
37
Figure 4: Miami, March CPS: Average wage in Borjas sample without blacks
4 obs./year, 1983–87
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Data from March CPS. ‘Earnings year’ is the year prior to the survey year, following Borjas (2017). ‘Borjas sample’
is non-Hispanic male workers age 25–59 with high school or less, who report positive annual wage and salary income,
positive weeks worked, and positive usual hours worked weekly. Thick red line shows average wage in Miami, with
dotted line showing 95% confidence interval for the annual mean, calculated using Supplement Weight. Dashed
line shows post-1980 continuation of pre-1980 linear trend in Miami. Thin green line shows average wage of same
type of workers in the control cities preferred by Borjas (2017): Anaheim, Rochester, Nassau-Suffolk, and San Jose,
calculated using Supplement Weight.
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Table 3: Wage and employment differences by race, March CPS 1977–1986
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Miami Card control cities Borjas control cities
Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted
Dep. var: log wage
Black −0.487∗∗∗ −0.465∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗ −0.215∗∗∗ −0.285∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗
(0.0737) (0.0728) (0.0315) (0.0321) (0.0760) (0.0770)
Dep. var: Unemployed (0,1)
Black −0.00480 −0.00345 0.0688∗∗∗ 0.0513∗∗∗ 0.0528∗∗∗ 0.0515∗∗∗
(0.0320) (0.0302) (0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0122) (0.0124)
Regressor is an indicator variable equal to 1 for black, 0 otherwise. Coefficients are from a pooled OLS regression
of each outcome on the black dummy and a constant term, and nothing else. Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The weighted regressions use the March Supplement weight. Wage
regressions: The sample is identical to the March CPS sample in Borjas (2017, Table 3A), and includes only male
non-Hispanic workers with less-than-high-school education, aged 25–59, who report positive annual wage and salary
income, positive weeks worked, and positive usual hours worked weekly. Unemployment regressions: The sample is
identical to the March CPS sample in Borjas and Monras (2017), and includes only male non-Hispanic workers with
less-than-high-school education, aged 25–59. The unemployment regressions cannot be run using data from Borjas
(2017) because that paper considers only employed workers, and tests for wage effects conditional on employment.
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Table 4: Israel: Placebo regressions, Borjas and Monras (2017) model
(a) Israel: Mean 1983 Soviet stock by education, real vs. placebo
Education group Real Placebo
Less than primary completed 478.8 486.1
Primary completed 742.5 743.4
Secondary completed 1735.0 1736.1
University completed 1116.3 1116.3
The placebo is a randomly-generated variable drawn from a Poisson distri-
bution with the same mean as the real variable.
(b) Israel: Placebo reanalysis of Borjas and Monras Table 6, cols. 3 and 4
Dep. var.: ∆ native wage (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Soviet fraction IV: Real Placebo Real Placebo
Émigré supply shock/pop. −0.616∗ −0.820∗∗∗ −0.611∗ −0.873∗
(0.316) (0.315) (0.334) (0.473)
Change in native population −0.00352 0.0229
(0.0707) (0.0976)
N 32 32 32 32
adj. R2 0.286 0.289 0.258 0.257
Kleibergen-Paap F 27.37 5.059 23.19 3.728
p-val. Anderson-Rubin F -test 0.0985 0.0272 0.113 0.0880
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The instrument in each column is:
(1) real 1983 Soviet fraction, (2) placebo 1983 Soviet fraction, (3) real 1983 Soviet fraction, (4) placebo 1983 Soviet
fraction. All specifications include education and occupation fixed effects.
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Table 5: Israel: Kronmal specification correction to Borjas and Monras
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: ∆ native wage asinh émigrésupply shock
Estimator: 2SLS OLS
Émigré supply shock/pop. −0.616∗
(0.316)
asinh émigré supply shock/pop. −0.642∗∗
(0.325)
asinh émigré supply shock −0.0348
(0.0443)
[−0.284]
asinh total pop. 0.0426 1.154∗∗∗
(0.0443) (0.196)
N 32 32 32 32
adj. R2 0.286 0.297 0.156 0.717
Kleibergen-Paap F 27.37 31.27 14.41 —
p-val. Anderson-Rubin F -test 0.0985 0.0995 0.548 —
asinh is inverse hyperbolic sine. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Square brackets show column 3 coefficient
adjusted to be comparable to column 1 coefficient (dividing by immigrant fraction of population). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The instrument in each column is: (1) 1983 Soviet fraction, (2) asinh of 1983 Soviet fraction;
(3) asinh of 1983 Soviet stock; (4) none. All specifications include education and occupation fixed effects.
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Table 6: Israel: Placebo regressions, Friedberg (2001) model
(a) Israel: Mean pre-migration stock per occupation, by education: real vs. placebo
Years of educ. Real Placebo
Less than primary (0–8) 7.257 7.199
Primary completed (9–11) 14.806 14.953
Secondary completed (12) 18.376 18.398
Some college (13–14) 29.206 29.295
Tertiary completed (15–26) 48.545 48.470
The placebo is a randomly-generated variable drawn from a Poisson distri-
bution with the same mean as the real variable.
(b) Israel: Placebo reanalysis of core result in Friedberg, Table III, row 4
Dep. var.: ∆ native wage (1) (2)
Lagged Soviet fraction IV: Real Placebo
Émigré supply shock/pop. (‘r’) 0.718∗∗ 0.402
(0.339) (0.807)
N 8353 8353
adj. R2 0.520 0.523
Kleibergen-Paap F 42.23 3.570
p-val. Anderson-Rubin F -test 0.0195 0.594
The émigré supply shock r in the original study is Soviet émigrés in 1994, per Israeli in 1994 in each skill-occupation
cell. The instrument in column 1, as in the original study, is the number of the Soviet émigrés who were in each
skill-occupation cell prior to migration, per Israeli who was in that cell in 1989. The instrument in column 2 is the
Poisson white noise from Table 6a divided by the number of Israelis in the cell in 1989. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications include education and occupation fixed effects.
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Table 7: Israel: Kronmal specification correction to Friedberg
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: ∆ native wage asinh émigrésin cell, 1994
Estimator: 2SLS OLS
Émigré supply shock/pop. (‘r’) 0.718∗∗
(0.339)
asinh émigré supply shock/pop. 0.742∗∗
(0.358)
asinh émigrés in cell, 1994 0.0780
(0.0666)
[0.572]
asinh Israelis in cell, 1994 −0.0531
(0.0529)
asinh Israelis in cell, 1989 0.629∗∗∗
(0.00233)
N 8353 8353 8353 8353
adj. R2 0.520 0.520 0.519 0.897
Kleibergen-Paap F 42.23 38.37 5.819
p-val. Anderson-Rubin F -test 0.0195 0.0211 0.115 —
asinh is inverse hyperbolic sine. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Square brackets show column 3 coefficient
adjusted to be comparable to column 1 coefficient (dividing by immigrant fraction of labor force). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The émigré supply shock r in the original study is Soviet émigrés in 1994, per Israeli in 1994
in each skill-occupation cell. The instrument in each column is: (1) the number of the Soviet émigrés who were in
each skill-occupation cell prior to migration, per Israeli who was in that cell in 1989 (as in original); (2) asinh of
the instrument in column 1; (3) asinh of the number of the Soviet émigrés who were in each skill-occupation cell
prior to migration; (4) none. All specifications include education and occupation fixed effects.
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Table 8: France: Placebo regressions, Borjas and Monras (2017) model
(a) France: Mean of 1962 Algerian stock by education, real vs. placebo
Education group Real Placebo
Less than primary completed 8020.0 8032.8
Primary completed 263.6 263.0
Secondary completed 83.6 81.8
University completed 30.0 29.4
The placebo is a randomly-generated variable drawn from a Poisson distri-
bution with the same mean as the real variable.
(b) France: Placebo reanalysis of Borjas and Monras Table 10, col. 3
Dep. var.:
∆ native unemployment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged Algerian fraction IV: Real Placebo Real Placebo Placebo
Repatriate supply shock/pop. 0.0887∗∗ 0.0488
(0.0384) (0.0502)
Algerian supply shock/pop. 0.247∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗
(0.0667) (0.126) (0.0669) (0.117) (0.118)
Change in native population 0.00279
(0.0123)
N 88 88 88 88 88
adj. R2 0.460 0.392 0.432 0.368 0.355
Kleibergen-Paap F 54.23 2.440 247.7 5.285 5.116
p-val. Anderson-Rubin F -test 0.000122 0.0000466 0.000542 0.00351 0.00382
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The instrument set in each column
is: (1) 1962 repatrié fraction and real 1962 Algerian fraction; (2) 1962 repatriate fraction and placebo 1962 Algerian
fraction; (3) real 1962 Algerian fraction; (4) and (5) placebo 1962 Algerian fraction. All specifications include
education fixed effects.
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Table 9: France: Kronmal specification correction to Borjas and Monras
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: ∆ native unemployment asinh Algeriansupply shock
Estimator: 2SLS OLS
Algerian supply
shock/pop.
0.282∗∗∗
(0.0669)
asinh Algerian supply
shock/pop.
0.282∗∗∗
(0.0669)
asinh Algerian
supply shock
0.00234∗∗∗ 0.00182∗∗
(0.000836) (0.000904)
[0.226]
asinh repatriate
supply shock
0.00151
(0.00249)
[0.044]
asinh total
native population
−0.00172 −0.00228 2.193∗∗∗
(0.00193) (0.00226) (0.141)
N 88 88 88 88 88
adj. R2 0.432 0.432 0.301 0.344 0.808
Kleibergen-Paap F 247.7 248.2 42.44 13.82 —
p-val. And.-Rub. F -test 0.000542 0.000543 0.0147 0.0154 —
asinh is inverse hyperbolic sine. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Square brackets show column 4 coefficients
adjusted to be comparable to column 1 coefficient (dividing by immigrant fraction of labor force). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The instruments in each column is: (1) 1962 Algerian stock/pop., (2) asinh of 1962 Algerian
stock/pop.; (3) asinh of 1962 Algerian stock; (4) asinh of 1962 Algerian stock and asinh of 1962 repatriate stock
(in the second stage, both 1968 stocks are considered endogenous); (5) none. All specifications include education
fixed effects. ‘asinh total native population’ means asinh of 1968 total population minus the inflow of repatriates
and Algerians.
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Table 11: Europe: Placebo regressions, Borjas and Monras (2017) model
(a) Europe: Mean 1990 Balkan stock by country, real vs. placebo
Country Real Placebo
Austria 2612.2 2615.0
Greece 6.2 6.3
Ireland 0.0 0.0
Portugal 2.9 2.5
Romania 11.3 11.4
Spain 0.0 0.0
Switzerland 3082.9 3096.1
The placebo is a randomly-generated variable drawn
from a Poisson distribution with the same mean as
the real variable.
(b) Europe: Placebo reanalysis of Borjas and Monras Table 13, cols. 3 and 4
Dep. var.: ∆ native unemployment (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Balkan fraction IV: Real Placebo Real Placebo
Balkan supply shock/pop. 0.456 0.583∗ 0.487 0.657
(0.311) (0.323) (0.376) (0.510)
Change in native pop. −0.00266 −0.00426
(0.0165) (0.0181)
N 195 195 195 195
adj. R2 0.741 0.740 0.739 0.737
Kleibergen-Paap F 17.72 6.189 16.34 5.219
p-val. Anderson-Rubin F -test 0.122 0.0204 0.187 0.149
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The instrument in each column
is: (1) real 1990 Balkan fraction, (2) placebo 1990 Balkan fraction, (3) real 1990 Balkan fraction, (4) placebo 1990
Balkan fraction. All specifications include education and country fixed effects.
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Table 12: Europe: Kronmal specification correction to Borjas and Monras
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: ∆ native unemployment asinh Balkansupply shock
Estimator: 2SLS OLS
Balkan supply shock/pop. 0.456
(0.311)
asinh Balkan supply shock/pop. 0.459
(0.314)
asinh Balkan supply shock −0.0132
(0.0119)
[−0.26]
asinh total pop. (without Balkan) 0.00992 0.955∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.201)
N 195 195 195 195
adj. R2 0.741 0.741 0.339 0.509
Kleibergen-Paap F 17.72 17.31 1.498 —
p-val. Anderson-Rubin F -test 0.122 0.122 0.0209 —
asinh is inverse hyperbolic sine. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Square brackets show column 3 coefficient
adjusted to be comparable to column 1 coefficient (dividing by immigrant fraction of population). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The instrument in each column is: (1) 1990 Balkan fraction, (2) asinh of 1990 Balkan
fraction; (3) asinh of 1990 Balkan stock; (4) none. ‘asinh total pop. without Balkan’ means asinh of 2000 total
population minus Balkan inflow 1990–2000. All specifications include education and country fixed effects.
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Appendix
A Additional evidence of compositional change
Appendix Table 1 shows a falsification test for the differences-in-differences regressions in Borjas
(2017, Table 5). It is identical to those regressions except for the dependent variable. In the original
regressions the dependent variable is the city-period average log wage; here, the dependent variable
is the city-period average years of education (within the subgroup of workers with less than high
school). This is a falsification test because the true treatment effect must be essentially zero: the
sample only includes men age 25 and over, whose education decisions are fixed. But there is a
large, negative, false treatment effect: the Boatlift appears to ‘cause’ a reduction in the average
schooling of this subpopulation by about half a year of education. This decline is statistically
significant relative to the Card control cities, but not the Borjas control cities. This evidence
suggests important negative selection into the subsample contemporaneous with the Boatlift.
Appendix Table 1: Falsification test with outcome as years of education
(1) (2)
Dep. var.: Years of education
Control cities: Card Borjas
1981–83 −0.348 −0.124
(0.446) (0.573)
1984–86 −0.444 −0.142
(0.267) (0.514)
1987–89 −0.562∗∗ −0.422
(0.230) (0.418)
1990–92 0.0578 0.384
(0.964) (0.936)
N 75 75
adj. R2 0.310 −0.029
Difference-in-difference regressions with pre-treatment period 1977–79. Year 1980 omitted
since it includes both pre-treatment and post-treatment observations, as in Borjas (2017,
Table 5). Unit of observation is city-period. Dependent variable is years of education.
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sample is
working non-Hispanic males age 25–59 with less than high school. The Card preferred control
cities are Atlanta, Los Angeles, Houston, and Tampa-St. Petersburg; the Borjas preferred
control cities are Anaheim, Rochester, Nassau-Suffolk, and San Jose.
B Compositional change in the March CPS versus May/MORG
Why would CPS coverage of low-skill blacks rise more in the March CPS than in the MORG? The
March CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data come from a one-off survey
that is not repeatedly applied to the same households. The MORG data, in contrast, are gathered
from households that have been interviewed repeatedly in a panel over a period of time that
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extends over either 4 or 16 months.38 It is well known that households in the CPS panel exhibit
a net reduction in reported members during the panel: “people leaving a household are correctly
identified, but new people entering a household are not always recorded” (Hainer et al. 1988, 517).
This non-replaced individual attrition is highest for those only loosely connected to the reference
person. In CPS data from 2006–2012, it is 11% for nonrelatives of the reference person who start
out the panel living at the residence without their own relatives (Robison and Grieves 2014, 1344).
Such attrition would likely have been larger in the 1980s, and almost certainly larger in low-skill
black households than the average. Low-skill black men in inner-city households are much more
likely than others to exhibit individual attrition from the CPS panel (Neumark and Kawaguchi
2004). These are many of the same low-skill black men in poor, inner-city neighborhoods who “have
tenuous or irregular ties with one or more households, but do not ‘usually’ live anywhere” (Hainer
et al. 1988, 525). Many are not reported at all by the overwhelmingly female survey respondents
in those neighborhoods—including almost a quarter of 25 year-old black men in the early 1980s
(Hainer et al. 1988)—unless probing questions are asked by specially-trained interviewers.
In other words, the undercount of low-skill black men would be most responsive to efforts to
increase coverage by more probing initial interviews about who lives at the residence, such as in
the one-off March CPS or at the initial interview of an incoming rotation group. But the same
people are among the most likely to disappear from the household roster by the time that earnings
questions are asked of the panel’s outgoing rotation group.
C Comparing coefficient estimates in the various studies
Friedberg (2001) and Borjas and Monras (2017) employ what is known as the skill–cell approach
to the impact of immigration. This uses variation in the density of immigrants across worker
groups defined by education and another dimension (geography, in the case of Borjas and Monras,
occupation in the case of Friedberg). The resulting regression coefficient should be interpreted
as the impact of immigrants of a particular skill on immigrants with the same skill, averaged
across skills. It does not represent the impact of all immigrants on all natives (the effect studied
by Hunt 1992), because it omits the impacts of immigrants of a particular skill on natives with
different skills. We ignore this difference when comparing results from skill–cell studies with the
Hunt (1992) coefficients. On the other hand, we do adjust the Hunt coefficient, which reflects the
impact of the share of immigrants (in the labor force), to correspond to the Borjas and Monras
and Friedberg coefficients, which reflect the impact of the ratio of immigrants to natives (in the
skill–cell). To do so, we multiply the Hunt coefficients (γ) by (1 − p)2, where p = 0.016 is the
aggregate share of immigrants in the French labor force; in practice, this multiplication by 0.97
38After rotating into the panel housing units’ occupants are interviewed once a month for four months,
ignored for eight months, then again interviewed once a month for four months. Questions about weekly
earnings are only asked of the outgoing rotation groups at the fourth interview (month four) and eighth
interview (month 16). Housing units are followed in the panel rather than people, so that if a new family
moves into the address during the panel they become the survey respondents.
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makes little difference. Proof:
∂u
∂(M/N)
=
∂u
∂(M/(M +N))
∂(M/(M +N))
∂(M/N)
= γ
∂
∂(M/N)
M/N
1 +M/N
= γ
1
(1 +M/N)2
= γ(1− p)2.
(A.1)
A more quantitatively important adjustment is made to the coefficients from the Kronmal-corrected
specifications to make them comparable to the Borjas and Monras and Friedberg coefficients. To
do so, we multiply the coefficient on the inverse hyperbolic sine of immigrants (θ) by (1 − p)/p,
where p is the immigrant share. Proof:
∂u
∂(M/N)
=
∂u
∂ logM
∂ logM
∂(M/N)
=
θ
M
∂M
∂(M/N)
= θ/(M/N)
= θ
1− p
p
.
(A.2)
Appendix Table 2 uses these relationships to show the coefficient estimates from the main text in
comparable terms.
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Online Supplement
“The Labor Market Effects of Refugee Waves
Reconciling Conflicting Results”
A Placebo and Kronmal-corrected regressions for Miami
Here we present reanalysis of the Miami regressions in Borjas and Monras (2017) mirroring the
reanalyses in the main text of the Israel, France, and Europe studies. Supplement Table 1 shows
the placebo regressions. Supplement Table 2 shows the Kronmal specification correction.
Supplement Table 1: Miami: Placebo regressions
(a) Miami: Mean 1977–1979 Cuban stock by education, real vs. placebo
Education Real Placebo
Less than high school 4912.2 4913.6
High school 2594.9 2599.2
Some college 1693.0 1698.3
College graduate 1293.6 1300.5
The placebo is a randomly-generated variable drawn
from a Poisson distribution with the same mean as
the real variable.
(b) Miami: Placebo reanalysis of Borjas & Monras Table 3, cols. 3 and 4
Dep. var.: ∆ log weekly wage (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Cuban fraction IV: Real Placebo Real Placebo
Mariel supply shock/pop. −1.263∗∗∗ −6.058 −1.310∗∗∗ −4.350
(0.320) (10.58) (0.322) (8.250)
Change in native population 0.0385 0.0606
(0.0382) (0.0739)
N 152 152 152 152
adj. R2 0.479 0.063 0.478 0.311
Kleibergen-Paap F 563.9 1.609 561.3 1.450
p-val. Anderson-Rubin F -test 0.00325 0.608 0.00265 0.652
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The instrument set in each column is:
(1) real 1977–79 Cuban fraction, (2) placebo 1977–79 Cuban fraction, (3) real 1977–79 Cuban fraction, (4) placebo
1977–79 Cuban fraction. All specifications include metropolitan area (3-digit) and education fixed effects.
S-1
Supplement Table 2: Miami: Kronmal specification correction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: ∆ log weekly wage asinh Marielsupply shock
Estimator: 2SLS OLS
Mariel supply shock/pop. −1.263∗∗∗
(0.320)
asinh Mariel supply shock/pop. −1.274∗∗∗
(0.330)
asinh Mariel supply shock 0.000662
(0.000618)
asinh total pop. (without Mariel) 0.00487 2.144
(0.00806) (2.691)
N 152 152 152 152
adj. R2 0.479 0.479 0.591 0.160
widstat 563.9 486.3 13.37
arfp 0.00325 0.00419 0.354
asinh is inverse hyperbolic sine. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The
instrument set in each column is: (1) 1977–79 Cuban stock/pop., (2) asinh of 1977–79 Cuban stock/pop.; (3) asinh
of 1977–79 Cuban stock; (4) none. ‘asinh total pop. (without Mariel)’ means asinh of 1981–1984 total population
minus Mariel inflow. All specifications include metropolitan area (3-digit) and education fixed effects.
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